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Summary. Wedevelop amodel of endogenous party platform formation in amulti-
dimensional policy space. Party platforms depend on the composition of the parties’
primary electorate. The overall social outcome is taken to be a weighted average
of party platforms and individuals vote strategically. Equilibrium is defined to ob-
tain when no group of voters can shift the social outcome in its favor by deviating
and the party platforms are consistent with their electorate. We provide sufficient
conditions for existence of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In the extensive literature on political economy and party competition it is com-
monly assumed that there exists a policy space in which the platforms proposed by
the parties can be seen as points. Voters have well-defined preferences over such
a space and, given an electoral rule, vote, possibly in a strategic manner. Many
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papers, dating back to Wittman [25], assume that parties are “ideological”, that is,
that they have preferences over the policy space. In this interpretation, one may
view parties as institutions that represent contesting interest groups in the society.
An ideological party adopts a platform that maximizes its expected utility, subject
to electability considerations.1 Most of the papers in the Wittman tradition share
the same basic assumption: parties, and their ideology, are exogenously given.
The ideology of a party, however, can hardly be viewed as an intrinsic feature of
the party itself, since it would generally depend on the preferences of its members.
At the same time, individuals choose to join a party taking into account its stand on
issues. It, therefore, seems that one should consider party membership and party
ideology simultaneously, so that both party membership and their ideologies are
endogenized.
In this paper, we provide a model of endogenous party formation in a setting
with amulti-dimensional policy space. The basic idea of ourmodel is the following.
A large society has to implement a vector of policies via a democratic procedure.
There are two established political parties. The parties function as aggregators of
preferences of the population and theypresentwell-definedplatforms for the general
vote. Agents are seen in a twofold role, both as voters and as party members. Each
agent can belong to (at most) one party. Preferences (ideology) of each party are
determined, according to some fixed aggregation rule, by the preferences of its
members. Preferences of parties will determine their electoral platforms. In the
general election, agents vote taking party platforms as fixed. After the vote takes
place, society implements a policy based on its results.
It may actually happen, that some agents prefer to vote for a party different from
the one they belong to. We view such a situation as unstable and inconsistent with
the system being in the overall equilibrium. Indeed, consider, for instance, the long-
term political realignment that has been occurring in the United States.Although, it
was once rather typical to find “liberal” Republicans and “conservative” Democrats
in the formerly “one-party” South, this is becoming increasingly uncommon. The
party ideologies having shifted, both types are no longer attracted to their historic
political homes even for the purpose of party registration.2
Of course, such a shift in party membership, in turn, must imply a change in the
preferences of the parties and, as a consequence, a change in their platforms. An
overall equilibrium requires that it is in the interest of each party member to vote
for the proposal of his or her party. In this way, both the membership of each party
and its ideology are endogenously obtained as a function of the overall distribution
of voters’preferences. The basic idea here is the same as the one used by Baron [6],
Ortun˜o-Ortı´n and Roemer [17] and Roemer [24], and it is inspired by the “voting
with one’s feet”models (see Caplin andNalebuff [9]).A similar strand of literature,
1 A recent and very complete version of such a model is provided in Roemer [24] (see also Os-
borne [18] for a survey).
2 Admittedly, this shift hasn’t been instantaneous. The delay can be best explained by phenomena
not modeled in this paper, such as the hierarchical nature of the political system, with different party
identities at the local (as distinct from the national) political level, party loyalty, or costly affiliation
change.
2
which studies political party activism with endogenous political party platforms, is
represented by Aldrich [1], Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ortı´n [11] and Poutvaara [21].
The major features that distinguish the model are the following.
i) The number of political parties is fixed, but ideologies and platforms of parties
are not.
ii) Parties aggregate preferences of their members, but do not necessarily behave
strategically in their choice of platforms.
iii) The implemented policy is a weighted average of the party proposals.
iv) Agents vote in a strategic way and are allowed to form coalitions.
Only the first two of these features are essential for our results. The first point
means that we take an institutional view of political parties. Our parties are not
short-term amalgamations of voters and candidates, but semi-permanent organiza-
tions that are part of the society’s political structure. This reflects the prohibitive
cost that non-party and new-party candidates often face in terms of such things
as name-recognition, organization, ballot-access, etc.3 Emergence of new major
parties, which in many established democracies such as the U.S. and U.K. is an
extremely rare, once-in-a-few-generations event of almost semi-constitutional im-
pact, is, therefore, not studied here.
We also assume that parties simply aggregate their members’ preferences. We,
thus, do not allow parties to respond strategically to platforms proposed by each
other. This can be justified by considering the case in which parties cannot commit
to policies. In this view, the preferences of parties and their leaders are well-known
to the society-at-large and altering the platform to achieve success in the general
election is not credible. Consequently, the proposals, or platforms, must coincide
with the ideal policies of the parties (see also Alesina [2] and Alesina and Rosen-
thal [3] for this assumption). This is also the assumption of the citizen-candidate
model of Osborne and Slivinski [19], Osborne and Tourky [20] and Besley and
Coate [7] (in these models candidates play a role similar to parties in our setting).
The formal extension of the model to the strategic setting is, actually, not
difficult. Allowing for strategic behavior by parties in their choice of platforms
would, however, generate serious difficulties with equilibrium existence. Indeed,
the problem of (Nash) equilibrium existence in multi-party spatial games has been
well-known for a long time and is particularly hard when the policy space is multi-
dimensional.4 Resolving this problem would require imposing very restrictive as-
sumptions on the distribution of individual preferences and/or possible platforms.
However, these existence problems have nothing to do with endogenizing party
ideology. Rather than concentrating on this well-known difficulty, we want to re-
strict our attention to the very distinct problem at hand. Of course, in many cases
where the game studied is known to have a Nash equilibrium, our results can be
easily extended to the strategic setting.
3 Indeed, even candidates with significant personal following and major ideological disagreements
with all existing parties, such as Jesse Jackson in the U.S. Democratic party, or Pat Buchanan (first
Republican, later Reform parties), seem to prefer working through established political organizations.
4 For a general view of the problem see, for example, Roemer [24]. See alsoRoemer [23] for existence
of an alternative equilibrium concept in the two-dimensional case.
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The other assumptions noted above are easily relaxable. In particular, one can
easily extend our model to the case in which agents vote sincerely, i.e. agents vote
for the platform they like the best according to their preferences, or to the case
when the implemented policy coincides with the platform of the winning party (the
“winner-takes-all” system).5
As noted above, attempts to endogenize party ideology have been undertaken
for some time. D. P. Baron [6] considers a multidimensional model with strate-
gic party behavior and sincere voting. Existence of equilibrium, however, is only
provided for a very specific two-dimensional example, with three parties and a
uniform distribution of voters. I. Ortun˜o-Ortı´n and J. E. Roemer [17] consider a
specific example of endogenous party formation in which the policy space is one-
dimensional. J. E. Roemer [24] deals with a two-dimensional policy space problem
but the nature of the political parties and the equilibrium concept are different from
those standard in the literature.
Our model differs from [6,17] and [24] in several important respects. First,
we provide general results on the existence of equilibrium, whereas [6] and [24]
provide only specific examples in a two-dimensional model. Furthermore, unlike
the example provided in [17], we don’t restrict ourselves to the case of a one-
dimensional policy space. In fact, proving existence of equilibrium in the one-
dimensional case is relatively easy. For higher dimensions, however, a different
approach to establishing equilibrium existence is needed.While the resultant proof
is quite involved, it provides important new insights in the nature of political parties.
Moreover, the existence result is robust with respect to changes in the party’s policy
choices.
An important aspect of the paper, is that it clarifies the relationship between the
dimensionality of the policy space and the existence of equilibrium. This relation-
ship is often seen as a negative one: the higher the dimension of the policy space is,
the harder it is to guarantee existence of equilibrium. This view is a consequence
of the well known results in the classical models of political competition, where
existence of equilibrium is very rare in two and higher dimensions (an exception
is the model in [23]). We show, however, that when ideology and membership of
the parties are endogenous to the model, it is harder to obtain existence in the two-
dimensional case than in the three-dimensional one (This even-odd phenomenon
applies to any dimension. Although it is very unusual to assume policy spaces of
dimension four or higher). This, however, does not imply that existence of equi-
librium in the two-dimensional policy space is always impossible and we indeed
show existence for the particular, but important, case in which the ideology of the
party coincides with the mean ideology of its members. In the end, one message
of the paper is that the odd-even dimensionality of the policy space might play
an important role for the equilibrium properties of a multi-party political system.
This apparently paradoxical result recalls the one first established by Caplin and
Nalebuff[9].
5 In this case, it is possible to introduce without any difficulty uncertainty of election outcome into
the model. The results would remain the same as in the certainty case.
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As noted above, an important feature of our model is the way the overall policy
outcome is determined.We assume that the implemented platform does not need to
coincide with the platform of the winning party. Namely, the implemented policy
is taken to be some convex combination of the parties’ platforms. The weights in
this combination are assumed to be an increasing function in the vote share (see
Grossman and Helpman [13], Ortun˜o-Ortı´n [16], Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ortı´n [11],
Alesina and Rosenthal [3,4]). We believe that this is a realistic assumption, which
captures the way many democratic societies adopt policies.
Another distinctive feature of this paper is our analysis of coalition formation
by voters. In our model, voters can form such coalitions; consequently, in equilib-
rium profitable deviations by coalitions are not allowed (a similar assumption also
appears in Alesina and Rosenthal [3,4] and Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ortı´n [11]). Other
variants of this assumption would yield the same results.
Our research is related to that of Osborne and Slivinski [19] and Besley and
Coate [7], who provide a model of “citizen-candidates” in which candidates are en-
dogenously determined. Themajor difference in our approaches is that the “citizen-
candidate” literature, for the most part, takes the individual candidates to exist
independently, outside any political party structure, which seems to be at odds
with the practice of most democratic polities. However, a recent extension of the
citizen-candidate model by Riviere [22] introduces political parties as one-shot
“cost-sharing organizations” formed, essentially, to finance the candidacy of its
leader. This is very much like the leader-driven political organizations in the emerg-
ing multi-party democracies, such as Russia in the early 1990’s. With the political
spectrum restricted to a small discrete set along a single dimension (for the most
part, only three positions are allowed: “left – center – right”), these “cost-sharing
parties” are endogenized by Riviere [22] within the context of a single election.
Our model is different in that we allow for a full multi-dimensional spectrum of
ideologies, and take a more institutional view of political organizations as features
of society’s political system.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the
basic model. Section 3 discusses the outcomes of voting games obtained by fixing
party platforms. Section 4 provides a two-party equilibrium existence result for the
case when the number of policy dimensions is odd. Section 5 analyzes the case of
two policy dimensions under the additional assumption that parties choose policies
by a mean voter rule.
2 The model
Consider a society consisting of a continuum of heterogeneous individuals, with
the set of possible types denoted byA ⊂ Rn. The set of agents shall be represented
by a measure space (A,B, F ), where B is the σ-algebra of (Borel) subsets ofA and
F is a measure over the type space.We shall assume that F is finite (and, therefore,
we may normalize
∫
A
dF = 1), with compact support and hyperdiffuse (that is,
every (n − 1) dimensional hyperplane in A is of zero measure).
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As it is standard in the theory of non-atomic games, measurable subsets B ∈ B
of the type spaceA shall be called coalitions. If for some coalitionC ∈ B,F (C) =
0, it shall be called a null coalition.
Let there be a fixed number of political parties6 M = {1, 2, ...m}. Individu-
als are free to join any of the parties, resulting in a population partition. Strictly
speaking, a partition is a collection of measures {Fj}j∈M over A such that for any
E ∈ B, one has
m∑
j=1
Fj(E) = F (E). However, we shall soon impose assumptions
which will insure that individuals of the same type will always be strictly better off
by going to the same community (except for, possibly, a null coalition of agents),
and consequently theFj’s aremutually singular. This suggests that it may be conve-
nient to restrict our attention to population partitions C = {Cj}mj=1 , with Cj ∈ B,
that are also partitions of the type space A into m coalitions. The set of all such
partitions we shall denote as Σ. Given such a partition C ∈ Σ, the membership
share of the party j ∈ M is wj = wj(Cj) = F (Cj). Hence, the vector of party
weights w = (w1, . . . , wm) is an element of the (m − 1)-dimensional simplex
∆m−1.
The society has to implement a vector of policies x ∈ X , where X is a non-
empty compact and convex subset of Rn. Every individual of type α ∈ A cares
only about overall policy outcomes. For simplicity, we shall restrict the class of
individual preferences considered.7
Assumption A1: (Euclidean preferences) Individual preferences over X of each
agent of typeα ∈ Amaybe represented by the utility functionu(x;α) = −||x−α||,
where || · || stands for the Euclidean norm.
Furthermore, we shall assume that X is sufficiently “large” in the sense that
every individual’s ideal point is part of the set X of feasible policies. In fact,
identifying individuals with their ideal policies, we shall assume:
Assumption A2: K ⊂ X , where K is the convex hull of the support of F .
2.1 Policy outcomes and voting
Suppose each party j ∈ M chooses to advocate the policy pj ∈ X . Facing a
policy profile p = {pj}j∈M ∈
m∏
j=1
X ≡ Xm, individuals shall vote, in a manner
explained below, inducing some population partition C with corresponding vote
shares represented by a vector w(C) ∈ ∆m−1 (when the underlying partition is
clear we shall just write w).
The overall policy outcome is a function of themanner in which the vote divides
between the parties, as well as of which propositions are on offer. In other words,
6 The set up of the model allows for more than two parties. Our results, however, will be proven for
the two-party case.
7 An extension of themodel to accommodate linear preferences,u(x;α) = α·x, as in Gomberg [12]
is, in fact, straightforward.
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there is some outcome function T : Xm × ∆m−1 → X . While, in principle, a
general set of outcome functionsmay be analyzed,wemaywant to restrict ourselves
to special classes of these. In particular, in this paper we shall focus on the “convex
combination” (or “weighted average”) outcome functions.
Assumption O1: T (p, w) =
m∑
j=1
gj (w) pj , where g ≡ (g1, ...gm) is a continuous
function from ∆m−1 to itself.
This assumption entails that the actual policy implemented in the society is a
consequence of a political compromise between the competing parties. Of course,
we will assume below that the weight each party has in the final outcome is directly
linked with the support it obtains.
Notice that for ε > 0, arbitrarily small, we can make the function g take the
values gj(w) = 1, for wj > 1/2 + ε. In other words, by choosing the function g
appropriately, one can approximate arbitrarily the “winner takes all” situation, i.e.,
gj(w) = 1, for wj > 1/2. At any rate, as already mentioned in the introduction,
with minor modifications our results can be directly established as well (without
having to deal with approximations) for the “winner takes all” case.
The following monotonicity assumption on the outcome function shall be im-
posed throughout.
Assumption O2: (strict monotonicity) For every i ∈ M , the weight gi(w) assigned
to party i is strictly increasing in the vote share wi obtained by that party.
Finally, we assume that, if a party policy proposal attracts no voters, it should
have no weight in the final outcome.
Assumption O3: (irrelevance of null voter coalitions) For every party i ∈ M , we
have that gi(w) = 0 whenever wi = 0.
It follows from O3 that, for each i ∈ M , if wi = 1, then gi(w) = 1. Given
a policy profile p ∈ Xm and the outcome function we define the voting game as
follows. Each individual votes for one of the political parties. Under the assumption
of Euclidean preferences and given the policy proposals represented by p and the
voting pattern represented by w, the payoff enjoyed by an individual of type α is
given by u(T (p, w);α) = −||α − T (p, w)||.
As it is standard in the multi-jurisdictional literature, we have postulated that
there is a continuum of voting agents. This is done in order to avoid existence
problems resulting from the non-convexity of the individual choice set. However,
the continuum assumption has its costs as well and it introduces some technical
problems.
In particular, in the context of a model with a continuum of voters, we face
the usual problem of voting incentives: since no individual by himself impacts the
outcome, any voting behavior may be rationalized. We could have assumed that
agents vote sincerely for the party whose policy platform they like the most. How-
ever, we are interested in studying implications of some sort of strategic behavior
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on behalf of the voters.8 This requires to use one of the equilibrium refinement
concepts based on the possibility of deviation by (non-negligible) coalitions. The
voting equilibrium concept we employ here is, essentially, the Aumann [5] Strong
Nash Equilibrium (SNE), modified to accommodate the model with a continuum
of agents.9
In general, the problem of existence of SNE in a voting game like the one
defined here, is highly non-trivial. Furthermore, even if an SNE exists, it may not
be unique. However, for the two-party case it may be shown that, for any policy
proposal profile with parties taking distinct policy positions, there does indeed exist
a unique SNE of the voting game.
In order to minimize the amount of notation involved it is convenient to express
strategy profiles of voters in terms of the partitions of the type space A among
parties.
Definition 1. A voting partitionC = {Cj}mj=1 ∈ Σ shall be called a Strong Nash
Equilibrium (SNE) of the voting game given by the policy proposal profile p ∈ Xm,
if there does not exist a partition C ′ = {C ′j}mj=1 ∈ Σ such that for all individuals
of types α ∈ B =
m⋃
j=1
Cj ∩ (A\C ′j) ∈ B,
u(T (p, w(C ′));α) ≥ u(T (p, w(C));α)
and, the set of agents α ∈ B for which the above inequality is strict has strictly
positive measure.
2.2 Party policy choice
So far, we have essentially assumed that the policies staked out by the parties are
exogenously given. However, party positions naturally depend on preferences of its
constituents. We assume that each party possesses a statute, which may be viewed
as a mechanism for establishing a policy platform, or program, as a function of
the environment. As it has just been discussed, a platform may be viewed as a
policy vector pj ∈ X , which the party j ∈ M would implement, if it could single-
handedly determine the society’s policies. It will be generally assumed that a party’s
platform is always well defined, given some set of relevant data. If party j ∈ M
takes into account just the way inwhich the population is partitioned, its statutemay
be viewed as a function P j : Σ → X . Following Caplin and Nalebuff [9], such a
8 The main results of the paper also hold in the case agents vote sincerely for the party whose policy
platform they like the most.
9 SNE may seem to involve much more coalitional reasoning than is likely in a model with a contin-
uum of agents. An alternative would be to consider deviations only by small (but non-null) coalitions
of “alike” agents. This could be justified by claiming that similar agents are more likely to be able to
communicate in order to be able to behave as a coalition, or by having agents believe that their be-
havior provides an “example” followed by other individuals with similar preferences. In terms of this
model, however, employing this, in principle, less restrictive equilibrium concept has the same effect as
employing the SNE.
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party shall be called membership-based.10 When all parties are membership-based,
we denote the profile of statutes as P : Σ → Xm.
Although P (C) takes as an argument the partition of the entire population, the
decisions of some people may actually be irrelevant for the party policy choice.
In fact, our model does not require that every citizen joins a political party. In
this interpretation, we may want to view the overall party membership as the set of
“political activists” (possibly,more radical, or justmore interested in party politics),
in the spirit of Aldrich [1].
A typical example of a membership-based rule would be the median-voter rule,
which tells each party to choose the ideal policy of its median member. While this
rule is only defined when individuals vary along a single dimension, in a multi-
dimensional context we may study, for example, the mean-voter rule.11 In general,
any profile of social choice rules aggregating preferences of the members of each
party would be in this class.
As noted in the introduction, the parties do not choose their policy platforms in
a strategic way. This is a reasonable assumption if, for example, we see P as the
function determining the ideal policies of the parties and they cannot make credible
commitments to policies. Under this interpretation, once parties are formed, agents
can observe their membership and infer the ideal policy that each party will try
to implement. Thus, voters will not believe announcements different from P (see
Alesina [2])
2.3 Equilibrium
In much of the earlier literature, the internal and external politics of the parties
have been treated separately. Nevertheless, the two are obviously interrelated, in
the sense that party membership determines policy platforms and policy platforms
serve to attract citizens to parties. Assuming that party membership coincides with
party electorate (an assumption that may be relaxed along the lines discussed in
Section 2.2), we say that equilibrium obtains when the voting partition resulting
from a policy profile on offer coincides with the membership partition inducing
this policy profile.
It is easy to construct equilibria with parties being identical in their policy posi-
tions. In this case, any voting pattern corresponds trivially to an SNE of the voting
game. Therefore, we are free to chose a population partition to support the iden-
tical party positions. Given the apparent “pluralism” of positions on policy issues
observed in most political systems, it is, however, of interest to study existence of
equilibria with non-identical parties.
10 In principle, more general domains for party statutes may be assumed. In particular, it may be of
interest to study the case in which parties respond in some sense to others’ actions. An extension of the
model along these lines is actually quite straightforward, as suggested by Caplin and Nalebuff [9].
11 This seems particularly fitting in the present context, since, under appropriate conditions, this may
be interpreted as the policy proposal that cannot be defeated by a super-majority of party’s members in
a binary voting (Caplin and Nalebuff [8]). See also Aldrich [1] and Baron [6], where it is assumed that
either the party platform or the ideal policy coincides with the mean ideal policy of a party activist.
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Definition 2. Given an outcome function T and a party policy function P , we say
that (p∗, C∗) ∈ Xm × Σ is a multi-party equilibrium if:
(i) p∗ = P (C∗)
(ii) C∗ is a SNE of the voting game induced by p∗.
If, furthermore, at least some of the equilibrium party proposals are distinct (i.e.,
pj∗ = pk∗ for some j, k ∈ M, j = k) such equilibrium is called pluralistic.
Given a multi-party equilibrium (p∗, C∗), the associated policy outcome is
T ∗ = T (p∗, w(C∗)).
3 Existence of voting equilibrium
Before tackling the problem of the pluralistic multi-party equilibrium existence,
we first have to find conditions which will ensure that the outcome of the voting
game obtained when party platforms are fixed is well defined. In fact, it turns out
that assumptions A1, O1 and O2 are sufficient to guarantee existence and unique-
ness of SNE in a two-party voting game for a large class of policy profiles. Let
S
n−1 =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
x2i = 1
}
denote the (n − 1)-dimensional
unit sphere inRn. From now on, we will restrict our attention to the two-party case.
Proposition 1. Let m = 2 and assume A1, O1 and O2. Then, for each policy
profile p = (p1, p2) ∈ X2 such that p1 = p2, the following holds:
(i) There exists a unique (up to a null coalition of agents) SNE of the voting game;
(ii) In an equilibrium C = {C1, C2}, the voters of each party (except, possibly,
a zero measure of them) may be separated by a hyperplane through the set
of types A, i.e. C1 = {α ∈ A : α · π ≥ b} for some (π, b) ∈ Sn−1 × R.
Furthermore, T (P (C), w(C)) is in the hyperplane {α ∈ A : α · π = b},
separating C1 and C2.
From now on, without loss of generality, we include, for convenience, the sep-
arating hyperplane {α ∈ A : α · π = b} of indifferent individuals in C1. To prove
the proposition we shall rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, a partitionC ∈ Σ is a Strong
Nash Equilibrium of the voting game if and only if
F
(
Cj ∩
{
α ∈ A : α · (pj − pi) < T (p, w(C)) · (pj − pi)}) = 0
for any i, j ∈ M such that i = j.
Proof of Lemma 1. I. Sufficiency. Fix i, j ∈ M with i = j. LetC ∈ Σ be a partition
such that the above is true. For each α ∈ A, consider Wα : [0, 1] → R defined by
Wα(λ) = −||α −
(
λpj + (1 − λ)pi) ||
Since,
dWα(λ)
dλ
=
1
Wα(λ)
(
α − (λpj + (1 − λ)pi)) · (pj − pi) ,
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the function Wα (λ) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in λ whenever α ·
(
pj − pi)−(
λpj + (1 − λ)pi) · (pj − pi) is positive (resp. negative). Therefore, by Assump-
tion O2, every coalition C of agents of positive measure such that α · (pj − pi) >
T (p, w(C)) · (pj − pi) for every α ∈ C, will be strictly worse off in joining any
(positive measure) coalition of agents deciding to vote for i, and, likewise, every
agent β ∈ A such that β ·(pj − pi) < T (p, w(C)) ·(pj − pi)will be strictly worse
off in joining any (non-null) coalition of agents deciding to vote for j.
II. Necessity. Suppose not. Let C be a SNE for which the condition does not
hold. Fix again i, j ∈ M with i = j and define
Dj = Cj ∩
{
α ∈ A : α · (pj − pi) < T (p, w(C)) · (pj − pi)}
Clearly, Dj ∈ B and, by assumption, F (Dj) > 0, for some j = 1, 2. Let us
suppose, for example, that F
(
D1
)
> 0 . Since F is hyperdiffuse, there exists
η > 0 such that F
(
D1η
)
> 0 where the set D1η is defined by
D1η = D
1 ∩ {α ∈ A : α · (p1 − p2)+ η < T (p, w(C)) · (p1 − p2)} .
Using hyperdiffuseness of F again, it is easy to show that there is a coalition
D′ ⊂ D1η of “sufficiently small” measure ε = F (D′) > 0. Consider the new
coalition C ′1 = C1 \D′, C ′2 = C2 ∪D′. That is, in the new partition C ′, agents in
D′ have changed their vote from party 1 to party 2.
Since, g is increasing, we have that w1 (C ′) < w1(C) as long as ε > 0, so
T (p, w (C ′)) · (p1 − p2) < T (p, w(C)) · (p1 − p2). By taking ε small enough,
and taking into account that g is also continuous, we may also guarantee that
T (p, w(C)) · (p1 − p2)− η < T (p, w (C ′)) · (p1 − p2) as well. But now we see
that the members of D′ are strictly better off, so C could not be a SNE.
Finally, note that, since F is hyperdiffuse, the partitioning hyperplane of “in-
different” voters
H =
{
α ∈ A : α · (p1 − p2) = T (p, w(C)) · (p1 − p2)}
has zero measure. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix the policy proposal p = (p1, p2) and, for each t ∈ R,
let
H(t) =
{
α ∈ A : α · (p1 − p2) = t}
denote a hyperplane, normal to the difference of policy vectors. For each λ ∈ [0, 1]
define
tλ =
(
λp1 + (1 − λ)p2) · (p1 − p2) .
Notice that t0 = p2 ·(p1 − p2) and t1 = p1 ·(p1 − p2). Thus,H (t0) (respectively
H
(
t1
)) corresponds to a hyperplane through p2 (respectively p1). Furthermore,
since tλ is strictly increasing in λ, we have that t0 < t1, whenever p1 = p2.
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Let C (t) ∈ Σ denote the population partition induced by H (t), i.e. C1(t) ={
α ∈ A : α · (p1 − p2) ≥ t}, C2(t) = {α ∈ A : α · (p1 − p2) < t}. Define the
(continuous) map h : R → R by
h(t) = h(t; p) = T (p, w(C(t))) · (p1 − p2) .
For every t ∈ R, we have that T (p, w(C(t))) belongs to the segment [p1, p2],
because g1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, t0 ≤ T (p, w(C(t))) · (p1 − p2) ≤ t1. Thus, h : R →[
t0, t1
]
. Since, g1 is strictly increasing, the map h is non-increasing in t.12 By the
intermediate value theorem, the restriction h :
[
t0, t1
] → [t0, t1] has a fixed point
t∗ ∈ [t0, t1], which satisfies
T (p, w (C (t∗))) · (p1 − p2) = t∗
The fixed point t∗ is unique because h is non-increasing. By Lemma 1, C(t∗)
corresponds to a unique (up to a zero measure of voters) SNE of this voting game.
	unionsq
Besides insuring existence and uniqueness of the SNE in the party voting game,
Proposition 1 restricts the set of the population partitions thatmay emerge as a voting
outcome. In fact, if we ignore deviations by null coalitions, then, given any two
distinct policy proposals, the population is partitioned by a hyperplane.
We shall denote the set of all population partitions into two non-empty com-
munities that may be induced by a pluralistic policy profile as Σˆ. Therefore, in
the two-party case Σˆ may be taken to be simply the set of all partitions of A by a
hyperplane. Each such partition C ∈ Σˆ may be parametrized by the unit normal
vector to the partition hyperplane πC ∈ Sn−1 (pointing in the direction of C1) and
an intercept bC ∈ R. As it has been already noted in Caplin and Nalebuff [9], under
such a parametrization and ignoring null coalitions, Σˆ is identified with an open
subset of Sn−1 × R which is homeomorphic to the whole space Sn−1 × R.13
Thus, from now on, we will identify the set of population partitions Σˆ with
the cylinder Sn−1 × R. And, abusing the notation, when there is no confusion,
we will not distinguish between population partitions in Σˆ and their associated
hyperplanes.
In view of the preceding discussion, the voting behavior may be used to define
a mapping from the set of all possible pluralistic policy profiles into the set of
population partitions V : Xˆ2 → Σˆ, where Xˆ2 = {p ∈ X2 : p1 = p2}, as follows.
For each p ≡ (p1, p2) ∈ Xˆ2, we define the induced orientation vector
υ1 (p) =
p1 − p2
||p1 − p2||
12 It may actually be constant only if shifting the hyperplane implies a change of decision by a null
measure of voters, i.e. if the hyperplane H(t) does not intersect the support of F .
13 As described, Σˆ may be identified either with the direct product Sn−1 × R (which we may view
as a cylinder) or with a M}obius band. The former, however, turns out to be the case, as long as we care
about the orientation of the normal vector π – i.e., the identity of a party adhering to a particular position
– which we obviously do here.
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and let υ2 (p) ∈
[
t0(p), t1(p)
] ⊂ R be the unique fixed point of h(t) constructed
in the proof of Proposition 1. We define then V (p) = (υ1 (p) , υ2 (p)) ∈ Sn−1 ×[
t0(p), t1(p)
]
. Note that other hyperplanes may induce equivalent partitions (i.e.
partitions which differ by a null set of agents) as well, as long as the total mass of
the population “between” them and the plane V (p) is null.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions A1, O1 and O2, the function V is continuous.
Proof. It is immediate that υ1(p) is a continuous function on Xˆ2. To see that υ2(p)
is a continuous function, notice, firstly, that h(t; p) is continuous in both variables.
Recall, that for each p ∈ Xˆ2 there exists a unique fixed point, t∗(p), of h(t; p).
This defines a mapping p → t∗(p) from Xˆ2 to R. By the continuity of Lefschetz’s
fixed point index (seeMcLennan [14]), for any open neighborhoodU of t∗(p) there
exists an open neighborhood W ⊂ Xˆ2 of p, such that for each p′ ∈ W , that this
(unique) fixed point t∗ (p′) must be in U . Hence, υ2(p) = t∗(p) is continuous.14
	unionsq
4 Existence of pluralistic equilibrium
In general, the problem of existence of pluralistic equilibria is highly non-trivial.
In the two-party case, however, we shall provide a rather strong existence result,
albeit depending somewhat on the dimension of A and X .
In order to do this, we restrict somewhat the class of admissible party statutes.
In particular, we would like to avoid policy rules that may depend on the choices
made by null coalitions of agents. We will, further, assume that parties would react
to “small” (but positive in measure) changes in membership with “small” policy
changes. This will be guaranteed by the following two-part assumption.
Assumption P1:
(i) (irrelevance of null coalitions) For any C,C ′ ∈ Σ which differ by a null
coalition of agents, we have that P (C) = P (C ′).
(ii) (continuity) P is continuous15 when restricted to Σˆ.
The above assumption allows us to restrict our attention to partitions in Σˆ
and to insure that the policy proposal profiles induced by partitions in Σˆ change
continuously with agents’ realignment.
At least for membership-based parties, it is not unnatural to assume that, if party
membership are on the opposite sides of a hyperplane, the preferred party policies
will not be the same.
Assumption P2: (distinct choices) If C ∈ Σˆ, then P 1(C) = P 2(C).
14 Note, that existence of the implicit function t∗(p) has been shown here without imposing even
differentiability of h. What we use here might be called a version of the implicit function theorem,
stating that, under compactness, the implicit function is continuous whenever it is well-defined, as long
as h(t; p) itself is continuous.
15 As mentioned above, we are identifying the space Σˆ of coalitions separated by a hyperplane with
Sn−1 × R endowed with the topology as a subspace of the corresponding Euclidean space.
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In otherwords, P2 says thatP
(
Σˆ
)
⊂ Xˆ2. Finally,we assume that party statutes
do reflect preferences of their members. In particular, we would like to avoid parties
making policy proposals relatively unpopular among their own members.
Definition 3. Given a non-null coalition B ⊂ A and proposals x, y ∈ X we shall
say that x defeats y by a δ-majority, in a (sincere) binary voting (by members of
B) if
F (Dx)
F (B)
≥ δ,
where Dx = {α ∈ B : u(x;α) ≥ u(y;α)}.
Assumption P3: (minimal primary support) There exists η > 0 such that, for any
C ∈ Σˆ for which both parties are non-null and for every i = 1, 2, the proposal
P i(C) cannot be defeated by a (1 − η)-majority by any other proposal x ∈ X , in
a binary voting by members of Ci.16
Assumption P3 has a number of significant implications about the policies that
can be generated by party statutes. Let K be the convex hull of the support of F .
Since the support of F is compact, so is K. For any Y ⊂ Rn, we let intY denote
the interior of Y and ∂Y its topological boundary. We have the following result.
Lemma 3. Suppose assumptions A1, A2 and P3 hold. Then,
(i) The policy proposalP i(C) ∈ intK, for every party i ∈ M and every partition
C ∈ Σˆ, such that Ci is non-null.
(ii) The overall policy outcome T (P (C), w(C)) ∈ intK, for every partition
C ∈ Σˆ, such that some Ci is non-null.
(iii) There exists a compact subsetKη ⊂ intK, such that for everyC = (C1, C2) ∈
Σˆ and i = 1, 2, we have that P i(C) ∈ Kη, whenever F (Ci) ≥ 12 .
Proof. Part (i) follows from P3. Assume that, for some i = 1, 2, there is C with
F (Ci) > 0 and such that P i(C) is on the boundary of K. Choose q so that(
q − P i(C)) · x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ K (this is possible, since K is convex).17 We may
take q arbitrarily close toP i(C). But, this would make the proportion of those party
members who prefer P i(C) to q, relative to the party membership size, arbitrarily
small.18
Part (ii) follows immediately from (i), since K is convex.
To see Part (iii), suppose F (Ci) ≥ 12 for some i = 1, 2. By assumption P3,
P i (C) cannot be defeated by any other policy proposal in an η/2-majority binary
voting by all agents in Ci. it follows that P i (C) cannot be defeated by an η/2-
majority by any other policy proposal in a binary voting by all agents inA. Thus, if
16 Of course, given the dimension of the policy space n, the minimal support level η can always be
chosen sufficiently small so that (1 − η)-majority winners actually exist.
17 In other words, q is on the line orthogonal to a supporting hyperplane of the convex hull K at
P i (C).
18 We are utilizing here the fact that F is finite and hyperdiffuse over compact support.
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P i(C) were arbitrarily close to the boundary of K, then (as in (i)) we may propose
an alternative q arbitrarily close to it.19 In this way, an arbitrary proportion of agents
will prefer q over P i(C), which contradicts Assumption P3. 	unionsq
We provide next an easy characterization of pluralistic equilibria. Consider the
function φ = (φ1, φ2) = (υ1 ◦ P, υ2 ◦ P ) = V ◦P . By assumptions P1 and P2, the
statute profileP maps continuously Σˆ into Xˆ2.And, by Lemma 2, V is continuous.
Hence, φ : Σˆ → Σˆ is a continuous function, as well.
Lemma 4. If C∗ ∈ φ(C∗), then (P (C∗), C∗) is a pluralistic two-party equilib-
rium. Furthermore, C ′ ∈ Σ may be an equilibrium partition only if it differs by, at
most, a null coalition from some C∗ ∈ φ(C∗).
Proof. The “if” part is trivial from the definition, since C∗ ∈ φ(C∗) means that
C∗ can be supported as a SNE of the voting game between the policy proposals
generated by C∗.
Conversely, consider a pluralistic two-part equilibrium partition C ′. By Lem-
ma 1, forC ′ to be a SNE of the voting game it may, at most, be different by the vote
of a null coalition from someC∗ ∈ Σˆ. Because of the irrelevance of null coalitions
(assumption (P1(i)) we know that P (C ′) = P (C∗). Therefore, policy proposals
induced by C ′ would support in SNE only voters’ partitions different by no more
than a null coalition from those in φ (C∗). Hence, the “only if” part of the lemma
follows. 	unionsq
We can now state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. If assumptions A1–A2, O1–O3, P1–P3 are satisfied, m = 2 and n is
odd, then there exists a pluralistic two-party equilibrium.
The basic idea of the proof is that wemay represent pluralistic equilibria as fixed
points of a deformation mapping on a compact subset of the cylinder Sn−1 × R,
which is homeomorphic to Sn−1 × [0, 1]. That the set of such fixed points must
be non-empty can be shown by applying Lefschetz’s fixed point theorem. (For a
survey of the mathematical results involved seeMcLennan [14] andMunkres [15]).
Similar ideas have already been used in Caplin and Nalebuff [9] and Gomberg [12].
The proof is broken up into five parts. Parts I and II characterize the relevant
subset Σ˜ of Σˆ; part III defines an auxiliary mapping φˆ : Σ˜ → Σ˜ which coincides
with φ in the interior of Σ˜; part IV shows that φˆmust have fixed points; and finally,
part V shows that all fixed points of φˆ are in the interior of the domain and, thus,
are also fixed points of φ. By Lemma 4, these correspond to the required equilibria.
Proof. To avoid possible confusion in the proof, it will be convenient to distinguish
between population partitions and the associated hyperplanes. Thus, let us denote
byΦ (C) = (Φ1 (C) , Φ2 (C)) the subsets of the population partition corresponding
to the hyperplane φ (C). We shall also consider the mappings π : Σˆ → Sn−1 and
b : Σˆ → R defined by π(C) = πC and b(C) = bC .
19 Take q on the normal to a supporting hyperplane of K at a boundary point which is “close” to
P i(C).
15
Part I. We shall prove that there exists ν > 0, such that for every equilibrium
partitionC and every party i = 1, 2 we have that F (Ci) ≥ ν. In fact, we will show
that there is some ν > 0 such that, if F (Ci) < ν for some party i = 1, 2, then
Φi(C) ∩ Cj = ∅, for the other party j = i.
Indeed, suppose otherwise. Then, we can construct a sequence
{
Ck
}
k
={(
Ck1 , C
k
2
)}
k
of population partitions in Σˆ, such that F
(
Ck1
) → 0 and for ev-
ery integer k, we have that Φ1
(
Ck
) ⊆ Ck1 .
By Lemma 3, for every C ∈ Σˆ, we have that T (P (C), w(C)) ∈ K, a compact
set. Hence, we may select a subsequence
{
Ck
}
k
(for simplicity, we use the same
notation), so that T (P (Ck) , w (Ck)) converges to a point, say q ∈ K.
By Proposition 1, we see that for each k ∈ N, the point T (P (Ck) , w (Ck))
is in the hyperplane separating Φ1
(
Ck
)
and Φ2
(
Ck
)
. And since Φ1
(
Ck
) ⊆ Ck1 ,
we must have that T
(
P
(
Ck
)
, w
(
Ck
)) ∈ Ck1 , for every k ∈ N. But, F (Ck1 ) → 0
implies that anyx ∈ intK belongs toCk2 , for some large enough k. So,we conclude
that q ∈ ∂K.
On the other hand, by assumptionO3, g1
(
w
(
Ck
)) → 0 and g2 (w (Ck)) → 1.
Hence, ||T (P (Ck) , w (Ck))−P 2 (Ck) || → 0. Bypart (iii) ofLemma3,wemust
have that P 2
(
Ck
) ∈ Kη, so q ∈ Kη is bounded away from ∂K, a contradiction.
Part II. Defining the domain. Take
Σ˜ =
{
C ∈ Σˆ : ν
2
≤ F (Ci) ≤ 1 − ν2 , for i = 1, 2
}
.
Since, the support of F is compact, for each π ∈ Sn−1 we may define
b(π) = inf
{
bC : πC = π,C ∈ Σ˜
}
and
b(π) = sup
{
bC : πC = π,C ∈ Σ˜
}
.
Thus, for every C ∈ Σ˜ with the first coordinate πC ∈ Sn−1, the intercept bC
belongs to the closed interval
[
b
(
πC
)
, b
(
πC
)]
.
It follows from hyperdiffuseness of F that, both b(π) and b (π), are continuous
functions of π ∈ Sn−1. This implies that Σ˜ is homeomorphic to Sn−1 × [0, 1], a
compact cylinder. Since, [0, 1] is contractible, Sn−1 is deformation retract of Σ˜.
Part III. The function φ may map some partitions from Σ˜ into Σ\Σ˜. We shall,
therefore, construct a continuous function φˆ : Σ˜ → Σ˜ as follows. The mapping
φˆ =
(
φˆ1, φˆ2
)
is defined by taking φˆ ≡ φ, when φ (C) ∈ Σ˜; but, by replacing each
φ (C) with
φˆ (C) =
{
(φ1 (C) , b(φ1 (C))) if φ2 (C) < b(φ1 (C))(
φ1 (C) , b(φ1 (C)
)
if φ2 (C) > b (φ1 (C))
That is, we let φˆ1 = φ1 and φˆ2 = max{b ◦ φ1,min{φ2, b ◦ φ1}}. Thus, φˆ inherits
the continuity from φ.
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Part IV. Now we prove that the set F
(
φˆ
)
of fixed points of φˆ is non-empty.
By Lemma 3, we see that P i(C) ∈ intK ∩ Ci for every i = 1, 2. Hence, the
inner product πC · (P 1(C) − P 2(C)) > 0. Therefore,
φ1(C) =
P 1(C) − P 2(C)
‖P 1(C) − P 2(C)‖ = −π
C .
And we see that φˆ1(C) = φ1(C) = −πC , for every C ∈ Σ˜.
We can chose ν sufficiently small and a point ξ such that all partitions by hyper-
planes through it belong to Σ˜. Let Ψ denote this set. Clearly, Ψ is homeomorphic
to Sn−1 and may be parametrized by πC . Furthermore, one may easily construct a
retraction r from Σ˜ onto Ψ = Sn−1. We can do this, for instance, by identifying
Ψ with Sn−1 × {0} ⊂ Σ˜ and Σ˜ with Sn−1 × [0, 1]. Under this identification,
the retraction map is r (π, b) = (π, 0). Consequently, we regard φ1 as a mapping
φ1 : Σ˜ → Ψ .
Consider now the map i ◦ φ1 ◦ r : Σ˜ → Σ˜, where i is the inclusion map from
Ψ = Sn−1 × {0} into Σ˜ = Sn−1 × [0, 1]. Using the above coordinates, we see
that i(φ1(r(π, b))) = (φ1(π, 0), 0). Since, φ1(C) = −πC for every C ∈ Ψ , we
have that i◦φ1 ◦ r is homotopic to the identity map. For instance, a homotopy map
H : Σ˜ × [0, 1] → Σ˜, between i ◦ φ1 ◦ r and the identity, is given by
H ((π, b) , t) =
(
tπ + (1 − t)φ1(π, 0)
||tπ + (1 − t)φ1(π, 0)|| , tb
)
Therefore, the Lefschetz number, Λ (i ◦ φ1 ◦ r) = Λ (identity) and the latter co-
incides with χ(Σ˜), the Euler characteristic of the space Σ˜ (Munkres [15]). But,
since Σ˜ is homeomorphic to the sphere Sn−1 × [0, 1], its Euler characteristic is
χ(Σ˜) = χ(Sn−1) = 2, for odd n.
In addition, there is a homotopy H˜ : Σ˜ × [0, 1] → Σ˜, between the mappings φˆ
and i ◦ φ1 ◦ r, given by
H˜ ((π, b) , t) =
(
φ1 (π, bt) , tφˆ2 (π, bt)
)
.
Hence, Λ
(
φˆ
)
= Λ (i ◦ φ1 ◦ r) = 2, does not vanish. By the Lefschetz fixed point
theorem (McLennan [14]), F
(
φˆ
)
= ∅.
Part V. We show, finally, that F
(
φˆ
)
⊂ int (Σ).
Suppose otherwise. Then, we can find a partition C∗ ∈ ∂Σ˜ such that φˆ (C∗) =
C∗. Hence, F (C∗i ) = ν/2 for some i = 1, 2. Say, F (C∗1 ) = ν/2. But then, we
have that F (C∗1 ) < ν and Φ1 (C) ∩ C∗2 = C∗1 ∩ C∗2 = ∅, which contradicts the
claim in part I.
To finish the proof of the Theorem, note that φˆ(C) = φ(C) as long asC /∈ ∂Σ˜.
Thus, Part V implies that F
(
φˆ
)
= F (φ), and we conclude that F (φ) = ∅. 	unionsq
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The existence result obtained above for the odd dimensional policy spaces is
quite general, in that it imposes relatively few restrictions on the internal policy
rules of the parties. One may argue that, since we are unlikely to observe precisely
political decision processes, both within parties and in the society as a whole, a
model which depends in a discontinuos way on changes in the specifications of
these processes is not likely to result in reliable predictions. Nevertheless, it is
possible to guarantee the robustness of the equilibria implied by Theorem 1 to
small changes in party statutes.20
Unfortunately, when the dimension of the policy space is even, we may only
achieve more limited results. The following example shows an even-dimensional
model satisfying all our assumptions and for which there is no Pluralistic Equilib-
rium. The construction of this example is closely related to the well known fact
that, there exists a continuous non vanishing vector field on the sphere Sk, if and
only if k is odd.
Example 1. There are two political parties,M = {1, 2}. For simplicity, we assume
that the policy space X = {x ∈ R2n : ||x− z|| ≤ 1} is a closed disc of dimension
2n with center z ∈ R2n. The boundary of X is S2n−1 an odd dimensional sphere.
For this example, one only needs that X is a compact, convex set whose boundary
is homeomorphic to the sphere S2n−1.
Let Y be a continuous non-vanishing vector field on S2n−1. We define the
policy rule as follows. Let C ∈ Σˆ be a population partition and let H(C) be the
hyperplane that separates C1 and C2. The intersection of H(C) with X is a 2n− 1
dimensional closed disk with center Z (C). Let r(C) be the line through Z(C)
orthogonal to H(C). The line r(C) intersects the boundary of X in two opposite
points ei ∈ Ci, i = 1, 2. Let di(C) ∈ Ci, for i = 1, 2 be the midpoint on r(C)
between Z(C) and ei. For each C ∈ Σˆ, the points di(C) are in the interior of Ci.
We construct now a continuousmap g : Σˆ → R++ such that, for every partition
C = (C1, C2) and for each coalition i = 1, 2, the points di(C) ± g(C)Y (ei) are
in the interior of Ci. We let now p1(C) = d1(C) + g(C)Y (e1) and p2(C) =
d2(C) − g(C)Y (e1). One checks easily that the functions p1(C) and p2(C) are
continuous.
By construction, for any given partition C, the segment
[
p1(C), p2(C)
]
is not
perpendicular to the hyperplane H(C). Thus, no pair of the form (P (C), C) can
be a pluralistic multi-party equilibrium.
5 The mean voter rule
While the example in the previous section highlights the difficulty of establishing
general existence results when there is an even number of policy dimensions, we
may still be able to obtain more limited results for some interesting classes of
policy rules. As an important example we shall show that, when policies are two-
dimensional and each party chooses for its proposal the ideal point of its mean
member, a two-party equilibrium must exist.
20 The details of this result which, for the sake of conciseness have been removed from the present
version of the paper, are available upon request from the authors
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Let us assume that the individual distribution on A is given by the non-atomic
measure F with a density f(x) and, for simplicity, identify the set of agents with
the set of policies, i.e., X = A ⊂ R2. As above, there are two parties and the
weights are given by the total population in each coalition
ω(C) = (ω1(C1), ω2(C2)) =
(∫
C1
f(x) dx,
∫
C2
f(x) dx
)
But now, we specify that the party policy choice of each coalition i = 1, 2 is its
center of gravity
P i(Ci) =
1
ωi(Ci)
∫
Ci
xf(x)dx(5.1)
=
1
ωi(Ci)
(∫
Ci
x1f(x) dx,
∫
Ci
x2f(x) dx
)
where x = (x1, x2) ∈ X and we have assumed that ωi(Ci) = 0. To avoid cum-
bersome notation, let us write pi = P i(Ci), ωi = ωi(Ci), for i = 1, 2, when there
is no possibility of confusion.
The outcome functionT (p, ω) = ω1(C1)p1+ω2(C2)p2 =
∫
X
xf(x) dx there-
fore results in a policy outcome which is independent of the partition. After a
translation, we may (and will) assume that T (p, ω) = (0, 0) ∈ X .
With this convention, p1 and p2 are colineal, pointing in opposite directions. In
general, p1−T (p, ω) and p2−T (p, ω) are colineal, pointing in opposite directions.
Proposition 2. Suppose that n = 2 and the policies chosen by the parties are
given by the rule in Equation 5.2. Then, there is a partitionC = (C1, C2) such that
(P (C), C) is a pluralistic equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1, the Strong Nash Equilibria correspond to coalitions C1
andC2 = X \C1 which are separated by a straight lineH(C) containing the point
T (p, ω) = (0, 0). We identify the unit vector, say q, orthogonal to the line H(C)
with the partition C = {C1, C2} so,
C1 = {x ∈ X : q · x ≤ 0}, C2 = {x ∈ X : q · x > 0}.
Since X is convex, by changing to polar coordinates we may write
X = {(r cos θ, r sin θ) : 0 ≤ r ≤ r(θ), 0 ≤ θ < 2π}
for some function r : [0, 2π) → Rn+. And we see that, the partition induced by the
vector q = (cosα, sinα) is then,
C1 =
{
(r cos θ, r sin θ) : 0 < r ≤ r(θ), α − π
2
≤ θ ≤ α + π
2
}
C2 =
{
(r cos θ, r sin θ) : 0 ≤ r ≤ r(θ), α + π
2
< θ < α +
3π
2
}
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We remark that q = (cosα, sinα) ≡ C = {C1, C2} is a pluralistic equilibrium if
and only if q is colineal with the vectors p1 and p2, that is if and only if p1 and p2
are orthogonal to the half-line{
r(cos θ, sin θ) : 0 ≤ r < ∞, θ = α + π
2
}
= {r(− sinα, cosα) : 0 ≤ r < ∞} .
Thus, the problem is reduced to show that we can find α ∈ [0, 2π) such that
G(α) = 0, where
G(α) = − sinα
∫
C1
x1f(x) dx + cosα
∫
C1
x2f(x) dx
Changing to polar coordinates, and using Fubini’s Theorem, this is the same as
−
∫ α+ 3π2
α+π2
∫ r(θ)
0
r2 sinα cos θf(r, θ) dr dθ
+
∫ α+ 3π2
α+π2
∫ r(θ)
0
r2 cosα sin θf(r, θ) dr dθ
=
∫ α+ 3π2
α+π2
∫ r(θ)
0
sin(θ − α)r2f(r, θ) dr dθ
=
∫ α+ 3π2
α+π2
sin(θ − α)g(θ) dθ
with
g(θ) =
∫ r(θ)
0
r2f(r, θ) dr.
Note that g(θ+2π) = g(θ). Making the change of variable θ = t+α, we see that
G(α) equals ∫ 3π
2
π
2
g(t + α) sin t dt,
Integrating now the function G(α) and using again Fubini’s Theorem, we obtain∫ 2π
0
G(α) dα =
∫ 3π
2
π
2
sin t
(∫ 2π
0
g(t + α) dα
)
dt
But ∫ 2π
0
g(t + α) dα =
∫ 2π
0
g(α) dα = A
is independent of t, because g(θ + 2π) = g(θ). Hence,∫ 2π
0
G(α) dα = A
∫ 3π
2
π
2
sin t dt = 0
and, by continuity of G, there must be some α ∈ [0, 2π) such that G(α) = 0. 	unionsq
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This result is, admittedly, more limited than the one obtained in the previous
section for the odd-dimensional case. Nonetheless, in the present setting the mean-
voter rule has some interest. Since, Caplin and Nalebuff [9] have shown that, under
some conditions on the distribution of individuals, the mean-voter proposal cannot
be defeated by any other alternative by a qualified majority in a binary vote. Also,
Grofman and Feld [10] have proved that, for n = 2, the winner under the mean
voter rule coincides with the winning proposal under the (generalized) Borda count.
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